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In response to the asymmetric advantage that at-
tackers enjoy over defenders in cyber systems, the 
cyber community has generated a steady stream of cy-
bersecurity-related frameworks, methodologies, ana-
lytics, and “best practices” lists. However, these arti-
facts almost never undergo rigorous validation of their 
efficacy but instead tend to be accepted on faith, to, we 
suggest, our collective detriment based on evidence of 
continued attacker success. But what would rigorous 
validation look like, and can we afford it? This paper 
describes the design and estimates the cost of a con-
trolled experiment whose goal is to determine the ef-
fectiveness of an exemplar systems security analytic. 
Given the significant footprint that humans play in 
cyber systems (e.g., their design, use, attack, and de-
fense), any such experiment must necessarily take into 
account and control for variable human behavior. 
Thus, the paper reinforces the argument that cyberse-
curity can be understood as a hybrid discipline with 
strong technical and human dimensions. 
1. Introduction 
Similar to other engineering disciplines, cyberse-
curity is a highly technical field that employs a broad 
range of mechanisms, such as encryption, authentica-
tion, access control, intrusion detection, and firewalls. 
Despite the technical nature of the field, the influence 
of humans on cybersecurity also looms large, as peo-
ple design, use, attack, and defend cyber-enabled sys-
tems. Thus, while not always appreciated as such, cy-
bersecurity is also a sociotechnical endeavor. 
An illustration of the human dimension of cyber 
is found in cybersecurity architecture and design. To 
create robust and secure cyber architectures, systems 
security engineers (SSEs) must determine the best way 
to combine technical mechanisms, such as those listed 
above, into cohesive and affordable architectures that 
are responsive to anticipated threat actions. Histori-
cally, SSEs have been left do what “feels right,” with 
decisions driven more by intuition and heuristics than 
by strong theoretical underpinnings supported by a 
body of empirical evidence [1][2]. In recent years, 
SSEs have increasingly sought out estimates of busi-
ness/mission risk and resilience to inform their engi-
neering decisions as well threat-based approaches for 
selecting targeted defensive mechanisms [3][4]. How-
ever, developing the estimates and making decisions 
have typically required tedious and subjective manual 
scoring and ranking processes. Unfortunately, re-
search suggests uncomfortably high scoring variance 
exists across teams that conduct such analyses [5]–[7]. 
Consequently, interest has grown in the use of au-
tomated decision support analytics to help SSEs to 
more reliably and systematically specify architectures. 
The question naturally arises as to the effectiveness of 
these analytics: are we better off using them than not? 
And if so, by how much? After all, while these analyt-
ics might help us to be more consistent in our choices, 
they might also help us to be consistently wrong; that 
is, they might help improve precision but not accuracy 
[8]. We therefore have a validation concern.  
Validation issues have been in the news in recent 
years in, for example, the social sciences context, with 
many examples of social science research having 
proven difficult to replicate [9][10]. How can we vali-
date candidate architecture-level cybersecurity analyt-
ics in a way that has a chance of successful replication 
by others? This paper discusses validation for an ex-
emplar cybersecurity analytic as an example of the 
larger validation concern in cybersecurity. By cyber-
security analytic we mean an automated procedure to 
estimate some quantity of interest to SSEs, such as risk 
or resilience estimates. The contribution of the paper 
is the description of a rigorous experiment for analytic 
validation that explicitly considers control for human 
variance. The paper also estimates the cost and poten-
tial benefits of running such experiments. 
 In the language of clinical trials, the experiment 
we describe is a randomized, double-blind design 
whose goal is to establish the safety and efficacy of a 
cybersecurity treatment. Here, the treatment is use of 
a cyber analytic for decision support purposes during 
architecture development. By safety, we mean that the 








treatment does not unwittingly make a system less se-
cure, as can happen, for example, if constituent cyber-
security mechanisms are themselves vulnerable and/or 
are combined in insecure ways. If the experiment is 
conducted with sufficient statistical power and in a 
manner that controls for variability, especially with re-
spect to human participants, then one can begin to 
make more confident, even causal, claims of effective-
ness that others, in the tradition of science, can then 
attempt to replicate. Such “gold standard” experiments 
are among the most expensive forms of validation, and 
they are rare in cybersecurity [11] even as they are 
common in other scientific fields, including the social 
sciences. Part of the reason they are uncommon in cy-
bersecurity, we suggest, is that the science of cyberse-
curity has been outrun by the furious rush to deploy 
systems over the past several decades, with the rapid 
and mass adoption of the Internet, the World Wide 
Web, and “Internet of Things.” The urgency in cyber-
security to “do something now” has, in our estimation, 
created a cultural bias against running costly experi-
ments that may result in negative findings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We 
begin by discussing definitions and related work. 
Next, to illustrate the experimental design for analytic 
validation, we describe an illustrative analytic as the 
target of the experiment. Subsequent sections cover re-
search method selection, experimental design, threats 
to validity, controls for those threats, and factorial de-
sign considerations. Before concluding, we discuss 
cost versus benefit. 
2. Definitions 
Validation. The term validation has multiple def-
initions in the literature. We adopt the International 
Standards Organization definition for validation [12]: 
“confirmation, through the provision of objective evi-
dence, that the requirements for a specific intended use 
or application have been fulfilled.” Validation consid-
ers whether a system addresses the intended mis-
sion/business needs. A closely related term, verifica-
tion, is the “confirmation, through the provision of ob-
jective evidence, that the specified requirements have 
been fulfilled” [12], i.e. that the system is built to 
match its specifications  [13]. Barry Boehm [13] fa-
mously summed up the difference between validation 
and verification as a determination of whether one has 
built the right system (to satisfy a user need) versus 
having built the system right (as specified).  
Validity. Despite being derived from the same 
root word, validity and validation are different, albeit 
related. We adopt Trochim’s definition of validity [14] 
“the best available approximation to the truth of a 
given proposition, inference, or conclusion.” Trochim 
describes many types of validity (e.g., face, construct, 
internal, external, sampling). Researchers must design 
studies with validity in mind, considering sampling 
techniques, confounding factors, and other elements 
that may affect research validity. 
Repeatability and Reproducibility. Repeatabil-
ity and reproducibility are “cornerstones of the scien-
tific process, necessary for avoiding dissemination of 
flawed results” [15]. Repeatability is the ability to run 
the same experiment using the same method and ob-
tain the same result. It is usually done by the same re-
searcher and is used to ensure that the research foun-
dation is stable. Reproducibility is the ability by inde-
pendent researchers to confirm the experimental re-
sults. The latter is more powerful as successful repro-
duction can support generalizability of the research, 
whereas failed reproduction can expose errors [16].  
3. Related Work 
This section surveys work relevant to validation in 
cybersecurity, including validation methods, chal-
lenges to science in cybersecurity, examples of pro-
gress towards achieving scientific rigor in cybersecu-
rity, repeatability and reproducibility challenges, and 
the social dimension of cybersecurity.  
Validation methods. Validation is not a mono-
lithic pass/fail endeavor that occurs just prior to use. 
Instead, we take steps towards validation across the 
system lifecycle. For example, we use peer review, a 
form of validation that relies mainly on face validity, 
to assure ourselves that we are building the right sys-
tem during requirements, analysis, design, and imple-
mentation. Likewise, pilot deployment (i.e. “taking it 
out for a spin”) can bolster validation efforts, espe-
cially when performed with the rigor of methods such 
as action research or case study. While they provide 
useful insights, such studies provide only point-in-
time information and are usually weak in external va-
lidity/generalizability. 
One can also gain insights when system usage is 
combined with survey research supported by formal 
models, such as the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM) [17], [18] and DeLone and McLean’s Infor-
mation System (IS) Success Model (D&M)  [19], [20]. 
TAM allows inferences between users’ perceived use-
fulness/ease of use of an IS and their intention/actual 
usage. By contrast, D&M permits drawing inferences 
between user satisfaction/actual usage and individ-
ual/organizational impact. But what is lacking so far in 
these techniques is causality, i.e. finding support that 
the system under evaluation has the desired impact on 
the problem it is intended to solve. Causality is the 





For this paper, that system is an analytic intended to 
support architectural cybersecurity decisions. 
Challenges to Science in Cybersecurity. Start-
ing in the 2000s, a significant uptick occurred in pro-
moting the application of scientific principles to cyber-
security as a way to advance the state of the art [1][11], 
[21]–[28]. Early on, one author noted that “In order to 
claim scientifically valid and justifiable results, com-
puter security experiments must follow the scientific 
method” and only then can “those who make decisions 
about the security of electronic voting machines, hos-
pital operating room equipment, and airplane soft-
ware” [27] trust in the technology. In fact, advocacy 
for experimentation in the larger realm of computer 
science dates back to at least 1998 [29] when Tichy 
promoted the practice and rebutted eight fallacious ar-
guments against doing so. More recently, Longstaff et 
al. asserted that “Understanding the underlying causal-
ity of information security could allow [the field] to 
leapfrog ahead in our solutions rather than just im-
prove incrementally in a never-ending arms race.” [11] 
Unfortunately, the authors also noted that while “find-
ing agreement in the use of the scientific method is 
practically universal, finding participation in the sci-
entific method is rare” [11]. In 2017, a researcher de-
cried a tendency to rely on the “uniqueness” of secu-
rity as an excuse for avoiding “practices ubiquitous 
elsewhere in science” [2]. Still, Landwehr [21] asserts 
that it is not too late for cybersecurity to embrace sci-
ence, noting that “scientific foundations frequently 
follow, rather than precede, the development of prac-
tical, deployable solutions to particular problems”. 
Scientific Experimentation in Cybersecurity. 
Peisert and Bishop [27] and Carroll et al. [28] describe 
key elements of the rigor necessary in scientific cyber-
security experimentation, including falsifiable hypoth-
eses, reproducible results, controlled independent and 
dependent variables, and accounting for confounds 
[27], [28]. Coopamootoo, et al. present a “design and 
reporting” toolkit that has nine key indicators of rigor-
ous design for cybersecurity experiments [30]. Alt-
hough the application of science in cybersecurity may 
not have advanced as far as we might have wished in 
the preceding decades (see [11], [23], [28], [29], [31] 
for some possible reasons why), some noteworthy ex-
perimental studies are in the literature [5][32]–[35].  
Repeatability and Reproducibility Challenges. 
While repeatability and reproducibility are fundamen-
tal to achieving rigor in cyber research, the infor-
mation needed by other researchers is rarely made 
available when such research is published [16]. Fur-
ther, Carroll et al. note that “Reproducibility is a chal-
lenge in cyber security due to the highly complex in-
terdependent systems” studied where “the state space 
is massive” [28]. As mentioned, human variability 
confounds repeatability, yet, as Tichy points out, other 
science-based fields, notably medicine and psychol-
ogy, have found ways to cope [29]. 
Cybersecurity and Social Science. Maxion et al. 
suggest that studying cybersecurity only through the 
lenses of engineering and the physical sciences may be 
the wrong model for many research questions. Better 
models may exist in “the social sciences which deal 
with the same sorts of complex and uncontrollable en-
vironments as cyber security, but nonetheless have 
well established methodologies for performing exper-
iments, analyzing data and reporting results so that 
others may build upon them” [31]. A 2017 National 
Academy of Sciences report concurs and encourages 
cross-disciplinary research collaborations between cy-
bersecurity researchers and researchers in domains in-
cluding “economics (e.g., incentives, resources), soci-
ology (e.g., social networks, norms, criminology), 
psychology (e.g., motivation, perception, user inter-
faces),” and more [36]. Passwords and security poli-
cies are intensely human aspects of cybersecurity; 
hence, it is not surprising to find examples of research 
blending cyber with the social sciences, a few of which 
include [37]–[39]. 
4. Analytic To Be Validated 
To provide a concrete example for our proposed 
experiment, we selected an exemplar analytic tool 
called BluGen [40] as the validation target. We chose 
BluGen because it is published in the open literature 
and, as its authors, we are familiar with its details. 
However, the approach applies to any similar analytic 
provided there exists a clear way of measuring out-
comes based on analytic use. Briefly, BluGen esti-
mates mission/business risk due to cyber effects and 
then recommends mitigations to help lower risk based 
on user-specified risk tolerance threshold levels. 
System security engineers may employ such an 
analytic to inform their decisions based on risk and 
mitigation recommendations, leading to an engineered 
system (Figure 1). The figure references “Blue Team-
E,” which we define as the team of security engineers 
responsible for selecting and engineering in the miti-
gations to a system. Later we reference “Blue Team-
D,” defined as the team that monitors and actively de-
fends the deployed system using the engineered de-
fenses and other tools. 
 





5. Measuring Outcomes 
The experiment’s goal is to find support for a 
causal relationship between use of the cybersecurity 
analytic, the independent variable, and improved mis-
sion/business outcomes, the dependent variable. Or-
ganizations employ cyber-enabled systems to achieve 
mission/business goals; thus, cybersecurity is primar-
ily focused on maximizing “mission” success despite 
adverse cyber events, such as malicious attacks.  
Put another way, we are trying to minimize the 
number of consequential attacks, CA. The CA count is 
relative to a given target cyber system, s, over a de-
fined operational time interval [t1, t2].  During the in-
terval, cyber attacks may occur, some of which are 
‘consequential.’ By consequential we mean an attack 
in which the performance for one or more defined mis-
sion essential functions of s drop below their associ-
ated minimum threshold values at one or more points 
over [t1, t2]. The proposed experiment evaluates the 
hypothesis, HA, and associated null hypothesis, H0 for 
the exemplar analytic: 
 𝐻0: 𝑈𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝐴. 
 𝐻𝐴: 𝑈𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐴. 
6. Research Method Selection 
Consistent with Herbert Simon’s “Sciences of the 
Artificial,” [41] cybersecurity analytics are con-
structed artifacts and should be evaluated as such. De-
sign Science Research (e.g., [42][43]) is helpful in this 
regard. Figure 2 from Venable, et al. [44] identifies 
validation approaches for artifacts prior to (Ex Ante) 
and subsequent to (Ex Post) characterization.  
 
Figure 2: Evaluation Framework [44] 
Given that our analytic is human-designed and al-
ready exists, our focus is on methods found at the in-
tersection of the “Artificial” row and “Ex Post” col-
umn of Figure 2. With causality in mind, we choose 
the “Lab Experiment” method from Figure 2.  
7. Experimental Design 
A posttest-only randomized experiment [14] is ap-
propriate in our context (Figure 3). This design is use-
ful for evaluating the internal validity of postulated 
cause-effect relationships. 
 
Figure 3: Experimental Design 
In this context, the cause is a blue team’s use of an 
analytic to inform the team’s engineering decisions 
and the effect is a system whose overall protections are 
hypothesized to show a decrease (improvement) in CA 
over a system whose protections are derived and im-
plemented manually. That is, the CA count is the post-
test. Researchers randomly assign teams to treatment 
and control groups. Blue Team-E members obviously 
know whether or not they are assigned to treatment or 
control lines based on the use/non-use of the analytic 
in question; however, they are blind to the users, Blue 
Team-D, and the Red Teams involved with the system 
they engineer. Per the usual definition, the red teams 
mimic the anticipated adversary by researching and at-
tempting to execute example attacks. Similarly, mem-
bers of the Red Teams and Blue Team-D are blind to 
whether they are in the treatment or control line.  
Establishing causality requires conformance to 
three requirements: temporal precedence, covariation 
of cause and effect, and lack of plausible alternative 
explanations [14]. Temporal precedence stems from 
using the analytic prior to security engineering design 
decisions per Figure 1. The effect, the CA count, is 
measured later when the system is deployed. Estab-
lishing covariance is also straightforward because we 
assert a binary condition, use/non-use of the analytic, 
where use is hypothesized to cause a decrease in CA 
on average compared to non-use. We cover alternative 
explanations below. 
To test the hypothesis, we run the treatment and 
control lines from Figure 3 multiple times holding the 
system and time interval constant in each run but var-
ying the users and blue teams and red teams, such that 
any team is used only once and is randomly assigned. 
Next, we calculate the two CA means, ?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  and 
?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 , as shown below. 
?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  CA sample mean of treatment groups  





The question is whether ?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  - ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  is 
statistically significant. Using a level of significance, 
 = 0.05, for example, then if p < 0.05, then we reject 
𝐻0  and find support for 𝐻𝐴, that is, the tool brought 
about a measurable decline in CA count on average. 
8. Threats to Validity 
Multiple questions arise in our efforts to control 
for threats to the validity of the experiment. Even if we 
measure a statistically significant effect support-
ing 𝐻𝐴, is the effect due to use of the analytic or is 
something else at play? That is, is the effect is due to 
some other confounding variable or set of variables? 
Alternative explanations are threats to internal validity 
and, hence, the causality argument. In addition, do the 
results generalize beyond the study context? Threats to 
external validity could work against broader applica-
bility of the analytic considered. 
We consider threats to validity in six categories: 
system to protect, blue teams, red teams, users, refer-
ence datasets employed by the analytics, and the ana-
lytics themselves (Table 1). We assign each threat an 
ID for later reference. The threats can be part of an al-
ternate explanation for the observed effect or can limit 
the external validity of the experiment. 
Table 1: Sample Threats to Validity 
System to Protect 
S-T1 System is not representative of real-world cyber 
systems of interest (e.g., in type, complexity) 
S-T2 System description is not an accurate representa-
tion of the target system 
Blue Teams (both -E and -D) 
B-T1 Blue team-E is overly constrained by time/budget 
constraints, limiting analysis and protections 
B-T2 Blue Teams-E/D are not adequately informed of 
threats the system faces 
B-T3 Blue teams-E/D are not representative of the kinds 
of teams typically encountered 
B-T4 Blue team-E did a poor job implementing defenses 
recommended by the analytic 
B-T5 Blue team-E was overly tolerant of risks and there-
fore did not implement all recommendations 
Red Teams 
R-T1 Red team did not adequately represent the antici-
pated threat 
R-T2 Red team was not given enough time to research 
and then attack the target system 
System Users 
U-T1 Users are not representative of real system’s users 
Reference Datasets Used by the Analytics 
D-T1 Asset type taxonomy is insufficiently detailed, and 
thus misses certain threats mapped threats 
D-T2 Threat capabilities represented do not faithfully 
represent the anticipated threat actor 
D-T3 Threat capabilities are incorrectly mapped to ap-
plicable asset types 
D-T4 Defensive capabilities are incorrectly mapped to 
threats they are intended to mitigate 
D-T5 The set of defensive capabilities is incomplete 
compared to capabilities available more broadly. 
Analytics 
A-T1 Analytic output is not useful and/or is ambiguous 
to blue teams 
9. Controlling for Threats  
Table 2 provides examples of possible controls for 
the threats described in Table 1.  
Table 2: Controlling for Threats to Validity 
Control Threats 
Adjust system types evaluated S-T1 
Apply multiple checks on system descrip-
tion (e.g., scan system if able, interview 
experts, review documentation)  
S-T2 
Establish a fixed, realistic time period and 
budget within which blue teams operate 
B-T1 
Ensure the blue teams are thoroughly 
briefed on the threat and that the team is 
confident in its ability to mimic the threat 
B-T2 
 
Employ blue teams with similar experi-




Assign a consistent risk tolerance thresh-
old for all blue teams to use. 
B-T5 
Allow a realistic and consistent time on 
target for the red teams 
R-T2 
Employ actual or representative users of 
the system during the experiment 
U-T1 
To help establish pedigree, match refer-
ence datasets to other sources and peer re-







Improve clarity of analytic descriptions 
and improve user training. 
A-T1 
 
10. Factorial Design Possibilities 
A factorial design with blocking can help tease out 
the effects of individual control variables on CA. An 
example appears in Table 3. A full factorial experi-
ment has 64 unique combinations of the six variables 
from Table 3. The expense of repeating the experiment 
for this many combinations would be high. However, 
holding certain factors at a fixed level as shown in Ta-
ble 4 results in a significant reduction of combinations 
from 64 to 4. 
Execution of the experiment in certain domains 
might further alter the combinations. For example, if 
the interest is primarily on cyber-physical systems 





team is asked to mimic the highest tier threat [45], the 
number of combinations reduces to 1. Of course, such 
reductions limit the breadth of external validity. 
Table 3: Factorial Design 
 
Table 4: Simplified Factorial Design 
 
11. Cost/Benefit Analysis 
This section presents a simplified and informal 
analysis of the costs and benefits of developing, vali-
dating, and employing an analytic similar to the exem-
plar analytic discussed above. Costs are in US dollars 
with standard prefixes for K-thousand, M-million, and 
B-billion. We assume a single factorial approach, a 
target IT enterprise system, and a high-tier adversary. 
We begin by considering losses due to attacks. Then 
we tally the cost of running the experiment and esti-
mate potential savings that such an analytic might 
bring. 
Loss Estimates. Cybercrime loss estimates vary 
and can be difficult to quantify due to the many cost 
components (Figure 4). At the macro level, an illustra-
tive example is the NotPetya attack of June 2017 [46] 
which affected government, energy, finance, defense, 
and other sectors across multiple countries, to include 
the United States. Global losses beyond those reported 
were estimated to be around $10B. The attack para-
lyzed the global shipping company Maersk, as the 
malware spread to terminal systems affecting their 
global shipping and logistics operations. The  com-
pany estimated losses of between $200M and $300M 
[47]. Separately, Accenture [48] estimates a per organ-
ization annual cost in the $7M-$18M range. 
 
Figure 4: Cost Components of an Adverse Cyber Events 
(not exhaustive; e.g., loss of life not included) [49] 
Analytic Development Costs. We use an analytic 
development cost of $5M, a figure we extrapolated 
from our own experience. The figure includes research 
and development of the analytic, as well as the devel-
opment of related software for management of refer-
ence datasets, the user interface, and reporting. Also 
included are testing, documentation, and certain over-
head costs (e.g., status reporting/oversight). 
Analytic Validation Costs. The cost of conduct-
ing a single run of the treatment and control lines for 
the experimental design in Figure 3 is on the order of 
$220K, with labor details given in Table 5.  
Table 5: Time to Run Experiment One Time 
  Treatment Control 
Blue Team-E 
Members 2 2 
Weeks 5 4 
Red Team 
Members 2 2 
Weeks 2 2 
Blue Team-D 
Members 2 2 
Weeks 1 1 
User Team 
Members 2 2 
Weeks 1 1 
Total hours 720 640 
Coordination hours 160 
Grand total hours 1520 
The table assumes a 40-hour work week and an 
average fully burdened hourly rate of $150.00. The hu-
man intensity of cyber is apparent, with four separate 
teams involved. The engineering blue team (Blue 
Team-E) has two members and is given four weeks to 
engineer protections into a target system. The treat-
ment team is given an additional week of training on 






The red team has two members and has two weeks 
to work, one for reconnaissance and one “on target.” 
The defending blue team (Blue Team-D) has two 
members and actively defends the system during the 
experiment. For added realism, two users use the sys-
tem during the test (and they may be a red team target).  
If we run the validation experiment 30 times to 
achieve a minimum level of statistical power, the ex-
periment cost is on the order of $6.6M. When added to 
the analytic development cost, the total is $11.6M. 
However, if we also assume that only one in four de-
veloped analytics (the exemplar analytic being just one 
tool) will prove to be effective, then we spend in ex-
cess of $46.4M to arrive at a single validated analytic. 
We further assume that the “shelf life” of the validated 
analytic is five years. Shelf life can be limited because 
threat actors may change their behavior over time suf-
ficiently to reduce/negate the effectiveness of the ana-
lytic and accuracy of associated reference datasets. 
Simplified Cost/Benefit Model. If, per the Ac-
centure estimates [48], we assume that the average 
large organization suffers an annual loss of $15M  and 
we further conservatively assume that (1) application 
of the analytic can reduce those costs by 5% yielding 
annual saving per organization of $750K and (2) the 
analytic costs $50K for annual licensing/training/sup-
port, then the annual savings accruing from use of the 
analytic is $700K or $3.5M over five years for a single 
organization. If 300 organizations employ the analytic, 
then the aggregate net five-year reduction in losses is 
roughly $1B. For 300 organizations at $50K per or-
ganization, revenue from the analytic is $75M. Table 
6 summarizes these figures. The model suggests a non-
trivial overall benefit based on the net payoff. 
Table 6: Net Loss Reduction / Benefit 
 
While we made several conservative assumptions 
(e.g., only one in four analytics successfully validate, 
yield only 5% savings, analytic shelf life is limited to 
five years, and only 300 organizations worldwide em-
ploy the validated analytic), we were not as conserva-
tive in other areas. Specifically, we assumed team 
sizes of two people each for blue/red/user teams. 
Teams are often larger, so doubling team sizes would 
nearly double the overall validation cost (a research 
question for future work is what an “optimal” team 
size actually is and what variables affect that size). In 
addition, we only allowed red teams one week to un-
derstand and surveil the target system. Sophisticated 
offensive cyber actors “in the wild” may spend months 
or years. However, in recognition of this fact, red 
teams are often given advance target information to 
help offset limited research time [6]. 
Three additional factors merit consideration. First, 
we did not address how much of an improvement (de-
crease) in CA is required in order to call the analytic a 
success. We merely stated the inequality and remained 
tacit on the magnitude, also an area of possible future 
work. Second, to strengthen external validity, one may 
wish to increase the factorial combinations tested (e.g., 
to consider different types of cyber systems). Lastly, 
there is the question of the labor pool from which to 
draw the teams in the experiment, particularly the red 
team labor pool. Recent experience has taught us that 
red team members tend to be in constant demand. 
Thus, the timely availability of skilled teams for par-
ticipation in experiments of the type we described in 
this paper suggests the need for a “red team reserve 
force.” The costs of assembling and maintaining such 
a cadre is a factor, though we note that such costs can 
be amortized across many validation experiments. An-
other possible way to reduce experimental costs and 
cybersecurity costs more generally is the use of auto-
mated red teaming algorithms that might serve as a 
proxy for human red teams. Work is on-going in this 
space (e.g., [50][51]) and the results may eventually 
become suitable for mimicking lower tier threats.  
12. Conclusion 
This paper described an approach for rigorously 
validating a cybersecurity analytic and the costs/bene-
fits of doing so. As discussed, clear challenges to ex-
perimentation in cyber exist, including grappling with 
an immense state space [28], controlling for con-
founds, and affording experimentation costs.  
Much of the variability that must be controlled re-
lates to the human/social dimension of cybersecurity. 
However, such challenges are not unique to cyber. The 
social sciences have found ways to deal with such var-
iability. As to the investment required, Schneider jus-
tified investment in a robust science of cybersecurity 





breaks a finger, and each year we create a new influ-
enza vaccine in anticipation of the flu season to come. 
But only after making significant investments in basic 
medical sciences are we starting to understand the 
mechanisms by which cancers grow, and a cure seems 
to require that kind of deep understanding” [24]. We 
argue that the cyber threat is more like cancer than a 
broken finger. Tichy [29] argued for increased formal 
experimentation in computer science some 23 years 
ago. Many would argue that cybersecurity needs to 
heed that advice to advance the field at a fundamental 
level. Some may argue that the future human footprint 
in cyber may drop as a function of increased use of AI-
driven “bots” that take on various cyber roles. While 
this is certainly possible, the bots themselves must be 
specified and trained by humans; therefore, we believe 
that the heavy human dimension to cyber will persist 
well into the future. 
Alas, our team lacked the funding to execute the 
experiment described. As discussed earlier, validation 
at this level faces the cultural headwinds that have 
tended to prioritize short-term action over long-term 
scientific results, even if that action can lead to a false 
sense of security. To mitigate those headwinds, we ad-
vocate for a focused partnership between government, 
academia, and industry to help jump-start a tradition 
of strong validation in cybersecurity with hopes of 
spurring more interest from all involved parties given 
the potential payoffs.  
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